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INTRODUCTION 
Are individual rights a danger to civil society? For almost forty years now, 
critics of individual rights have argued that such rights damage, rather than 
support, our national aspirations for equality, community, and democracy. 
According to civic republicans, these rights insulate the rights holder from 
communal criticism and legal recourse for the harmful consequences of his 
rights-protected actions; atomize the rights holder’s sense of self, thus limiting 
his circle of concerns to only his immediate entitlements; and isolate him from 
the suffering and well-being of his neighbors and co-citizens.1 Critical legal 
theorists add that, while an individual’s rights may enhance his liberty, they 
may also compromise the equality of others and rhetorically legitimate – or 
even valorize – the subordinating consequences of the individual’s rights-
protected behavior.2 According to both groups of critics, individual rights, 
 
* Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law 
Center. 
1 See JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013) (“In recent years, communitarian, civic republican, 
and progressive thinkers and politicians have argued that our constitutional system takes 
individual rights too seriously, to the neglect of responsibilities, virtues, and the common 
good.” Id. at 1.); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE (1991) (“No aspect of American rights discourse more tellingly illustrates the 
isolated character of the rights-bearer than our protean right of privacy.” Id. at 48.); 
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998) (“The priority of 
the subject can only mean the priority of the individual, thus biasing the conception in favor 
of individualistic values familiar to the liberal tradition. Justice only appears primary 
because this individualism typically gives rise to conflicting claims.” Id. at 11.); Peter 
Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 
62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984) (“And by acting toward each other as if we believe all this and 
that it must be believed, we coerce each other into remaining passive observers of our own 
suspended experience, hiding together inside the anonymity of artificial self-presentations 
that perpetually keep us locked in a state of mutual distance.” Id. at 1581.). 
2 See Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 399-404 (1988) (“[A] 
non-communitarian conception of rights must inevitably come to regard the quest for 
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whatever good they do, also cast democratic processes and democratic 
outcomes – including those that promote equality – as a source of oppression 
from which individuals must be protected. These are now familiar charges, 
made over the past half century by Marxists, legal realists, critical-rights 
theorists, and civil republicans all. Individual rights, according to their critics, 
come at some cost to equality, community, democracy, or all three.3 For all of 
these reasons, on balance, individual rights harm rather than benefit civil 
society, and do violence to our democratic aspirations. 
In this Article I hope to complicate these familiar critiques of individual 
rights. Throughout I contrast two emerging rights paradigms and their effects 
on our shared civic life, institutions, and projects. The first paradigm is 
exemplified most vividly by some of our most modern constitutional rights. I 
argue that these rights do indeed pose a threat to civil society. The second 
paradigm, however, is rooted not in the Constitution, but in our civil-rights 
traditions. Our modern civil rights, in contrast to most modern constitutional 
rights, not only support but are necessary for civil society. Consequently, civil 
rights pose no threat to civil society, and indeed constitute its legal 
architecture. I conclude that we should not respond to the critique of rights by 
jettisoning rights or the idea of rights, but by refocusing and expanding upon 
our civil-rights traditions. 
In Part I of this Article I identify and criticize a cluster of constitutional 
rights, which I argue do tremendous and generally unreckoned harm to civil 
society, and do so for reasons poorly articulated in earlier critiques. At the 
heart of the new paradigm of constitutional rights that I believe these rights 
exemplify is a “right to exit.” On this conception of individual rights, a 
constitutional right is a right to “opt out” of some central public or civic 
project. This understanding of what it means to have a constitutional right hit 
the scene a good two decades after civic republicans and critical legal theorists 
mostly had formed their respective critiques of individual rights. Consequently, 
such thinkers failed to incorporate the notion of constitutional rights into their 
critiques. The particular exit rights that I enumerate – that is, the rights to exit 
 
substantive equality itself as a threat to rights, and not as an indispensable foundation of true 
liberty and autonomy.” Id. at 401-02.); Introduction: Revitalizing Rights, RIGHTS, at xi, xiii 
(Robin West ed., 2001) (“Rights have constituted obstacles . . . to the creation or 
maintenance of humanistic, egalitarian, diverse, environmentally healthy and just 
communities.” Id. at xiii.); cf. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 
1385-94 (1984) (“The distinction between negative and positive rights reflects and perhaps 
is based on a fundamental aspect of our social life. We fear that others with whom we live 
will act so as to crush our individuality, and thus we demand negative rights.” Id. at 1392.). 
3 Horwitz, supra note 2, 396-97 (“History thus shows us that rights are a double-edged 
sword, and for most of our constitutional history, in fact, a single-edged sword.”); Robin 
West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 
YALE L.J. 1394, 1405-21 (2009) (“[A]pparent gains in justice wrought through legal change 
are sometimes offset by what might be called the ‘legitimation costs’ of the same legal 
breakthrough.” Id. at 1406.). 
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from the benefits and responsibilities of public projects, including public 
education, publicly funded policing, civil rights commitments, and public 
health projects – harm civil society in profound ways not appreciated by rights 
critics in the 1970s and 1980s. The harm these rights do, to borrow language 
from the title of Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein’s recent book,4 has 
turned out to be even worse than it might have seemed in the heyday of our 
rights critiques. I urge a reinvigorated rights critique that centers on these new 
rights and new harms. 
In Part II I discuss a countertrend: the expansion of civil rights beyond those 
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Some of our most newly created 
civil rights, generally created by Congress and state legislatures rather than 
announced by courts, in effect extend to individuals various rights to enter civil 
society, or some civil project close to its core. I call these civil rights “rights to 
enter” – these include, for example, the right to a high quality and public 
education,5 the right to purchase health insurance at affordable costs,6 the right 
to a safe home and neighborhood free of gun violence,7 the right to nurture a 
newborn or sick family member while not losing one’s job,8 the right to marry 
 
4 THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 
(2012). 
5 As reflected, for example, in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (“The purpose 
of this title is to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to 
obtain a high-equality education . . . .” Id. § 1001, 115 Stat. at 1439); Race to the Top, 
Notice of Proposed Priorities, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,804, 37,804 (July 29, 2009), which is funded 
in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 14005-
14006, 123 Stat. 115, 282-84; as well as in numerous state constitutions, see, e.g., ARIZ. 
CONST. art. XI, § 1, cl. A; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
 In spite of the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate the case for a constitutional right to 
education, it has often referred to education as one of the state’s central purposes, thus 
effectively casting it as a civil right. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) 
(“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.”). 
6 The Affordable Care Act rests squarely, if implicitly, on a civil right to health care. See 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 
U.S.C.); Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (2012); see Steven J. 
Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991); Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111 (1991) (“No citizen shall be subject to 
uncheckable violence by anyone other than the state . . . .” Id. at 129.). 
8 The Family and Medical Leave Act implicitly recognizes such a right. See Family 
Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 and 29 U.S.C.). 
  
896 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:893 
 
whom one loves regardless of sex,9 and the right to work and school 
environments free of discriminatory animus.10 All of these civil rights, 
imperfectly recognized in various statutes, invite participation in some core 
sphere of civil society: education, insurance markets, neighborhoods, family, 
marriage, or employment. These civil “rights to enter,” which stand in contrast 
to constitutional “rights to exit,” exemplify both an old idea that dates back to 
the early days of the republic, and a new idea that invites participation in a 
radically transformed civil society. Not only are these rights not harmful to 
civil society, they are integral to it. 
Now, what is the relation between these two kinds of individual rights? 
Generally, civil rights to enter are clearly not buttressed by constitutional rights 
to exit, and increasingly are threatened by them. First, both our historical and 
more modern civil rights to enter civil society – the various civil rights won in 
the nineteenth century by freed slaves and wives, and in the twentieth century 
by racial and religious minorities; women; the disabled; the elderly; school 
children; gay, lesbian and transgendered citizens; laborers; economically 
struggling parents; and the victims of hate crimes and private and domestic 
violence – are not constitutional rights at all, and for the most part the courts 
have declared as much.11 Although there exists a civil right to these societal 
benefits, there is no clearly defined constitutional right to an adequate public 
education, to a police force, to some measure of health care, to be free of 
private discrimination in employment, to safe and fairly remunerated labor, or 
to help with child care while employed. All of these rights, however, are at 
least arguably civil rights. And some of them are core civil rights. But 
increasingly the Constitution not only fails to protect these civil rights but also 
threatens to undermine them, insofar as it grants individuals and corporations 
the right to exit precisely those civil projects and legal institutions that civil 
rights seek to guarantee others the right to enter. Civil rights and constitutional 
rights are thus decidedly not co-constitutive of a unified constitutional 
tradition, or of an articulable American identity, or a distinctively American 
conception of the nature of rights. Rather, civil rights and constitutional rights 
are on a collision course. 
 
9 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-20a (West Supp. 2013) (codifying the right to marriage 
for opposite- and same-sex couples); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2012 
& Supp. 2013) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (2012 & Supp. 2013) (same). 
10 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of sex in education programs that accept federal funds); id. tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e to 2000e-17 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in the workplace). 
11 See, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756-70 (2005) (holding that there is 
no constitutional right to a police force); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-203 (1989) (same); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that there is no constitutional right to education); The Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-14 (1883) (holding that there is no constitutional right to be 
free from discrimination by private actors). 
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In both Parts I suggest that the almost ten-year-old constitutionally 
grounded, individual right to bear arms, particularly when combined with the 
broadened understanding of self-defense embodied in “stand your ground” 
laws, jointly constitute a paradigmatic, and maybe the paradigmatic, “exit 
right.” By contrast, the civil rights to physical security, and to state protection 
against private violence that interrupts it, are at least as old as the Constitution 
itself, and exemplify the civil rights paradigm I try to describe: the right to 
state protection against private violence is the quintessential and foundational 
“right to enter.”12 I conclude with the observation that, while the constitutional 
right to own and use a gun and the civil right to protection from the state 
against private violence, are in obvious tension, the constitutional right to gun 
ownership recognized by the Supreme Court does not necessarily foreclose the 
possibility of a civil right to decent effective gun-control laws.13 Perhaps if we 
could spark a renewed civil rights movement, aimed at legislative activism 
rather than judicial activism, we might inspire a lawful and politically salient 
civil response to the threats to our safety and the tears to our social fabric that 
are occasioned by the Court’s newfound constitutional right to own and use 
lethal weapons. The same may also be true more broadly. My general 
conclusion is that the way to repair the damage done to civil society by 
constitutional exit rights might be simply to reinvigorate our civil rights 
agenda. 
I. RIGHTS TO EXIT 
Over the last thirty years a fair number of the constitutional rights courts 
articulated, litigants asserted, or scholars advocated, either in the Constitution 
or in the law, are rights of individuals or corporations to opt out in some way 
of obligations otherwise imposed on citizens, be it by democratically 
authorized social or public projects, common law, intimate or private 
associations, or social institutions. Such constitutional exit rights do not simply 
expand individual liberty by recalibrating the boundary between the state’s 
 
12 In his classic definition of civil rights contained in his essay, Rights of Man, Thomas 
Paine identified the right to protection by the state against physical violence as the classic, 
core instance of a civil right: 
Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his existence. Of this kind 
are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those rights of acting as 
an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural 
rights of others. Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a 
member of society. Every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right pre-
existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in 
all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and 
protection. 
THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 68 (John Seelye ed., Penguin Books 1984) (1791-92). 
13 The Court in District of Columbia v. Heller explicitly observed the constitutionality of 
a wide range of gun control measures, considerably more than we currently enjoy. District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008). 
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police power and the individual’s sovereign sphere of action. Instead, they 
provide the right to establish a separate sovereignty free of the influence or 
power of the state. The right confers the power to exit some core goal, project, 
or commitment of civil society. 
The Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence is exemplary of 
this trend, particularly its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller granting to 
individuals a constitutional right to bear arms for in self-defense.14 It is easy to 
lose track of how radically antiliberal such cases are. According to our entire 
liberal tradition – including Hobbes,15 Locke,16 Rawls,17 and Nozick18 – as 
well as the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause19 
and the Enforcement Act of 1871,20 the simple yet powerful image of the state 
as a watchman lies at the core of the social contract. In exchange for 
relinquishing our natural rights to violent self-help, which is destructive of 
communal life, the watchman promises to protect us and our property from 
private violence. Without that social contract, “the life of man [is] nasty, 
brutish, and short,”21 primarily due to the potential for unchecked lethal 
violence of all upon all.22 By entering into the social contract, laying down 
arms, and trusting the sovereign watchman to guard against private violence, 
the individual loses liberty but gains security. 
The individual retains, of course, carefully drawn rights of self-defense, 
delineated in each state’s criminal code. Legal rights of self-defense predate 
not just Heller, but the Second Amendment itself. But before Heller and prior 
to the widespread enactment of “stand your ground” laws, those common law 
rights were narrowly drawn precisely to prevent society from slipping into a 
vengeful and revenge-driven Hobbesian state of nature. Only if an individual 
reasonably believes that he is imminent danger of serious bodily harm and has 
no opportunity to escape may he use force in self-defense – and even then, he 
may only use force necessary for self-defense.23 Outside of these constrained 
 
14 Id. 
15 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 92 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) 
(1651). 
16 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 70-71 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 
Macmillian Publ’g Co. 1952) (1690). 
17 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (1971). 
18 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 23 (1974). 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1994); Heyman, 
supra note 7. 
20 Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (2012). 
21 HOBBES, supra note 15, at 89. 
22 Id.; see also LOCKE, supra note 16, at 71 (“[M]en being partial to themselves, passion 
and revenge is very apt to carry them too far and with too much heat in their own cases, as 
well as negligence and unconcernedness to make them too remiss in other men’s.”). 
23 For example, to justify a homicide on self-defense grounds in Maryland, the accused 
must establish (1) that he had reasonable grounds to believe that he was in apparent 
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and last-resort rights, the obligation and the power to protect the individual 
against violence and theft are committed to the state. This is the essence of the 
civil contract that underlies liberal society. As I discuss below, the 
foundational civil right of the individual to look to the state for protection, as 
well as the obligation of the state to provide such protection (often called the 
first duty of the state24) are not just essential to, but constitutive of, civil 
society. 
Against this backdrop the right that the Court recognized in Heller is not just 
a threat to the coherence and strength of a state’s capacity to protect 
individuals against violence, but also threatens the contractual arrangement at 
the heart of civil society. After Heller the individual may turn to the state for 
protection against violence, but he has no obligation to do so. He may choose 
instead to take up arms, stand his ground, and protect himself against such 
violence. Under Heller he has a constitutional right to use lethal force and own 
lethal weapons to protect himself against violence or theft, whether in his home 
or elsewhere.25 Under the various “stand your ground” laws enacted post-
Heller, the individual now has the right to use that force regardless of whether 
he has an opportunity to retreat.26 When coupled with the resulting stand your 
ground laws, Heller essentially grants a right to privatize the policing function 
of the civil state. 
Viewed in social contract terms, this expansion of our constitutional rights 
follows logically, if tragically, from the Supreme Court’s famous declaration in 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services27 that the 
individual has no constitutional right to expect, and the state has no duty to 
provide, a police force.28 The state may be morally obligated to do so under the 
terms of the social contract, as philosophers of the liberal state have understood 
it. And it may even be highly desirable for the state to take that obligation upon 
itself. But the state is under no constitutional duty to do so, and the individual 
has no constitutional right to expect it. In Heller, the Court simply recognized 
the consequences for the social contract recognized in dicta in DeShaney. If the 
state is not constitutionally obligated to provide protection against private 
violence, then the individual must be allowed to reclaim broad and natural 
rights to lethal self-defense that he relinquished in exchange for that obligation. 
 
imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm from his assailant; (2) that he 
in fact believed that he was in such danger; (3) that he did not provoke the conflict; and (4) 
that the force used was neither unreasonable nor excessive. Roach v. State, 749 A.2d 787, 
793 (Md. 2000). 
24 See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 7, at 509. 
25 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). 
26 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 704.1 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.972(1) (2009). 
27 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-203 (1989). 
28 Id. at 195 (“[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the 
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private 
actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee 
of certain minimal levels of safety and security.”). 
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After Heller, then, the individual has the constitutional right to exit the social 
compact. It is important to note, however, that the state breached first. 
So what harm has this constitutional right done to civil society? After 
DeShaney we have no constitutional right to a police force. We do, however, 
have a natural right to defend ourselves – a right that many states have 
broadened substantially through “stand your ground” laws. And after Heller 
we now have a constitutional right to the weaponry necessary to exercise that 
right to self-defense. Civil society is weakened when the scope of fully legal 
lethal violence is broadened. Unsurprisingly, this travesty has led to not just an 
increase in domestic violence,29 but also to a spate of high profile killings 
deemed legal under stand your ground laws.30 The world that DeShaney and 
Heller conceive is one in which the sovereign has given up its monopoly on 
legal violence and abdicated its responsibility to protect the citizen against 
private lethal aggression. 
Heller is paradigmatic of the exit phenomenon I illustrate, but it is by no 
means the only example. Protection against violence is not the sovereign’s 
only obligation, nor is it civil society’s only core project. A second sovereign 
obligation is education, as recognized by the Court in Brown,31 as declared by 
virtually every state constitution,32 and as constantly reiterated by professional 
educators and state leaders. Here as well, though, the Court has been quite 
clear: Just as we do not have a constitutional right to a police force, likewise 
we do not have a well-articulated constitutional right to a high quality public 
education.33 
What does the Constitution grant? If anything, arguably, it grants the right 
only to a minimum level of education.34 Thus, in a development that parallels 
the DeShaney-Heller arc, homeschooling advocates increasingly have urged 
courts to identify not a right to a public education but a right to avoid one – not 
a right to the benefits of this project so central to civil society, but a right to 
exit it.35 Advocates of home schooling seek the right to pull their kids out of 
 
29 For an argument that draws on Lockean and Hobbesian social contract theory to argue 
that DeShaney is fundamentally confused on this point, see Laura Rae Dove, A 
Constitutional Right to Police Protection and Classical Liberal Theory: Complement, Not 
Conflict, 4 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 37, 61-68 (2013). 
30 See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin 
Killing, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2013, at A1 (“In finding him not guilty of murder or 
manslaughter, the jury agreed that Mr. Zimmerman could have been justified in shooting 
Mr. Martin because he feared great bodily harm or death.”). 
31 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
32 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1, cl. A; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; VA. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1. 
33 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194-203 (holding that there is no constitutional right to a police 
force); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (finding no 
constitutional right to education). 
34 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. 
35 For a general discussion of the homeschooling movement and its legal underpinnings, 
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public education and educate them at home, free from the oversight of public 
educators, using curricular material of their own making or bought online from 
for-profit cyber “charter schools.”36 Although not yet judicially recognized, 
this claimed constitutional “right to home school” clearly exists in the realm of 
popular constitutionalism: advocates press for it, courts are leaning toward it, 
parents expect it, state legislatures increasingly acknowledge it, and cash-
starved school boards act as though it already exists.37 Parents’ seek this right, 
more often than not, out of a profound and genuine desire, backed by religious 
belief, to exit virtually all “public” aspects of society’s education project. 
Theirs is a desire not to participate in, and not to subject their children to, 
public schools that are open to all, funded with tax dollars, and staffed by 
professional educators who aim to instill norms of tolerance and liberalism, all 
toward the goal of educating future citizens. The homeschooling community, 
or at least the best organized part of it, seeks quite explicitly to exit this 
intergenerational social compact, by which one generation funds the education 
of the next in the interest of building a strong civil society. Their legal 
advocates and the occasional lower court have articulated the contours of a 
constitutional right to home schooling, under the First Amendment’s free 
exercise clause, the substantive due process prong of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, or both. Whatever the textual backing, the logic and rhetoric is 
that of exit: Parents should have the right to exit this core feature of the social 
contract and core function of the state in civil society. 
 
see Rob Reich, On Regulating Homeschooling: A Reply to Glanzer, 58 EDUC. THEORY 17 
(2008); Rob Reich, Why Homeschooling Should Be Regulated, in HOMESCHOOLING IN FULL 
VIEW 109 (Bruce S. Cooper ed., 2005); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education off the Grid: 
Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (2008). For an 
example of the inclination of courts to recognize something like a right to homeschool, see 
Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
36 For a full discussion of the online curricula used by the homeschooling movement, see 
DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR 180-97 (2013). 
37 In In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), a California appellate 
court refused to entertain an argument that the California Constitution granted parents a 
constitutional right to homeschool their children. As the court explained: 
The trial court’s reason for declining to order public or private schooling for the 
children was its belief that parents have a constitutional right to school their children in 
their own home. However, California courts have held that under provisions in the 
Education Code, parents do not have a constitutional right to home school their 
children. Thus, while the petition for extraordinary writ asserts that the trial court’s 
refusal to order attendance in a public or private school was an abuse of discretion, we 
find the refusal was actually an error of law. 
Id. at 79. 
 After a three month period of statewide revolt, the court reversed itself, holding that there 
is such a right based on the California Constitution and California state law, and strongly 
suggested the existence of a federal constitutional right as well. Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 592 (holding that parents have “a constitutional liberty interest in directing the 
education of their children” that can only be overridden by a compelling state interest). 
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The blossoming right to homeschool and the now established right to bear 
arms – the former a part of the “popular constitution,” and the latter a part of 
the adjudicated one – are the most visible and most significant of the new 
generation of exit rights. But they are by no means the only ones. Recently, 
catholic churches, hospitals, and schools have sought “exemptions” from not 
only the various mandates of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), but also the 
obligations imposed on employers by the Civil Rights Acts, on the ground that 
those acts violate these institutions’ First Amendment rights to free expression 
or free speech. On this theory the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC granted church affiliated 
employers far ranging “ministerial exemptions” from the mandates of the Civil 
Rights Acts, giving them the power to fire, hire, and promote any employee 
whom they designate a “minister” free from the constraints of the 
antidiscrimination norm at the heart of those laws.38 The Catholic Church has 
long enjoyed a blanket exemption from those acts in order to retain its right to 
an all male priesthood.39 But increasingly, secular employers, citing 
conscience-based objections, have sought similar exemptions from the 
insurance mandate in the ACA.40 The textual bases of these various 
“conscience exemptions” differ, but common among them is a deeper impulse 
to recognize a right to exit the obligations imposed by popular legislation 
intended to safeguard the individual’s right, regardless of gender, race, or 
disability, to participate in employment and education free from 
discrimination. 
Using logic that is strikingly similar to that employed in the context of 
challenges to the ACA mandates, the Court has also found that public-sector 
unions that represent member and nonmember workers alike in collective 
bargaining activities cannot require objecting nonmembers to pay special fees 
for the purpose of financing the union’s political and ideological activities.41 
Justice Roberts implies in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius that individuals can exempt themselves (albeit at the cost of paying a 
tax) from an obligation to purchase insurance that not only facilitates, but is 
essential to, a public health project.42 Moreover, states have a constitutional 
exit right to refuse to expand their poorer citizens’ access to health care, as 
 
38 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 710 (2012) (“The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.”). 
39 See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 
1168 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying “ministerial exception” to bar a Title VII claim for gender 
discrimination). 
40 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
41 See, e.g., Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2291-96 
(2012). 
42 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585-91 (2012). 
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required by the law.43 In a long and complex body of law, courts have found 
that employers and sellers have various rights contractually to opt out of the 
obligations that tort, contract, and consumer law otherwise impose, by 
contracting with their employees or purchasers to arbitrate any disputes.44 
Today’s exit rights paradigm did not come out of nowhere; it has a 
decidedly liberal, Warren Court-Berger Court pedigree. Decisions treasured by 
liberals of all stripes and of a somewhat older vintage grant substantive due 
process rights to avoid the obligations pressed upon citizens to respect life and 
the moral demands imposed by a community reflected in its laws. Thus 
pregnant women can “exit” their pregnancies, at least in the first trimester and 
so long as they pay for the abortion, exiting both their biological relation with 
an unwelcome fetus and their relation with a moralistic legislature seeking to 
ensure that they maintain that relation.45 Dying persons can similarly exit their 
lives, to some degree, exiting not only their own life but also civil relations 
with their caretakers, relatives, and co-citizens.46 The same logic of exit from 
civil society or civil projects is foreshadowed in these older cases. Thus, 
although we do not have constitutional rights to health care, assistance with 
parenting obligations, or a livable family wage – a proposition so obvious that 
the Court has never even had occasion state it – we do have a constitutional 
right to exit family obligations we cannot afford through abortion. Likewise, 
we do not have a constitutional right to hospice care, but we do have – at least 
according to the consensus among liberal constitutionalists – a right to die 
when our pain becomes unbearable.47 For several decades now, Amish families 
have enjoyed the right to be entirely free of the duty to educate their teenagers, 
either in public or private or home schools.48 And religious families since the 
 
43 Id. at 2607 (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the 
Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that States 
accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to 
do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away 
their existing Medicaid funding.”). 
44 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (striking down a 
California judicial rule regarding the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in 
consumer contracts on the grounds that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the rule). 
45 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that the state may not regulate a 
pregnant woman’s decision to have an abortion during “the stage prior to approximately the 
end of the first trimester”). 
46 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (upholding Oregon’s physician-assisted 
suicide statute based on “the structure and limitations of federalism, which allow the States 
‘great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, 
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons’”). 
47 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41 (discussing Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 
96-110), 1996 WL 708956). 
48 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972). 
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twenties have had the right to educate their children in private religious schools 
and schools that immerse their children in languages other than English.49 In 
these early education cases, as in the modern homeschooling cases, there are 
no rights to, but there are robust rights out of, civic education. All of these 
older liberal rights, in various ways, permitted or encouraged exit, whether 
from pregnancy, from family, from life itself, from public education, from 
secular influences, or from the English speaking community. And all of these 
valorized liberal rights form the precedential background of today’s decidedly 
illiberal exit rights: the much more modern rights to exit the social project of 
policing, of education in toto, of antidiscrimination, of public health, and so on. 
All of these exit rights – both the older liberal ones and the newer libertarian 
ones – tolerate, permit, or overtly encourage exit from projects central to and 
maybe constitutive of civil society: a publicly funded police force, responsible 
to and for the community’s safety; public education, paid for by tax dollars and 
staffed by professional public educators who teach a core of knowledge and 
critical thought essential for eventual public citizenship; parentage itself, its 
obligations, and the community’s moral consensus that values it; health care 
for the elderly and sick, including obligations of hospice, paid for by insurance 
to which we all contribute; access to courts and to a common law for the 
redress for private wrongs; and fair labor and compensation in workplaces, 
ensured by a unionized labor force. Individuals now have constitutional rights 
to exit virtually all of these social projects.50 And while they have roots in a 
handful of substantive due process cases that go back a century, their 
proliferation today is a decidedly contemporary phenomenon. They do not 
merely recognize the right to individual liberty. Rather, they identify separate 
spheres within which a state’s freely acknowledged sovereign power simply 
does not reach. The individual homeowner is sovereign, with sovereign powers 
of violence both in his home and around his “ground” on which he “stands.” 
The Church and its employers are sovereign, free of the obligations imposed 
by Congress not discriminate on the basis of suspect characteristics. The 
employer whose conscience is bothered is free of the obligation to comply with 
an insurance mandate or a civil rights law. The healthy individual is free of the 
obligation to purchase an insurance contract. The nonmember worker is free of 
the obligation to pay dues earmarked for political activity to the union that 
protects his bargaining power. The fundamentalist parent arguably has the right 
to exit the obligations as well as the web of rights of public education. Of 
 
49 Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-
36 (1925). 
50 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (Medicaid 
expansion); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2291-96 (2012) 
(union fees); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (litigation); 
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-203 (1989) (police 
force); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (public 
education); Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (parentage). 
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somewhat older vintage, but of some consequence in this regard, pregnant 
women and dying citizens have the right to sever the bonds of civic association 
as well as earthly coils, through exercising constitutionally protected choices. 
Exit rights are fast becoming a central, if not the central, paradigm of 
constitutional meaning. 
The damage exit rights do to civil society is not insubstantial and cannot 
easily be quantified. Critical legal scholars and civic republicans have not 
successfully articulated this damage in their rights critiques. The problem is 
not that exit rights insulate subordination or inequality in a private sphere – 
although many of them do that – or that they tear at communitarian bonds – 
although most do. Rather, the distinctive harm done by the proliferation of exit 
rights is to both the reality and the aspiration of e pluribus unum. They create, 
in its stead, an aspiration, and to some degree a reality, of e pluribus pluribus. 
From many comes many. Many views may proliferate as to what the 
conscience requires with respect to discriminatory hiring practices. Many 
individuals may have access to legal and utterly lethal force because we have 
not collectively delegated that power to a central sovereign whom we all 
endow with a monopoly on legal violence. We need not work toward a core 
curriculum that recognizes an education required of all our children that will 
prepare them for the future. Instead we can educate our children independently 
toward individualized educational goals, not for citizenship in a civic society, 
but for, say, membership in a Kingdom of God, or a community of believers. 
We have constitutional rights, in other words, to defy the pull of our 
conscience or our obligation to civil society. By the light of these decisions, 
that is now what it means to be a rights-holding American. 
II. RIGHTS TO ENTER 
The heart of e pluribus pluribus, though, is not rights and not “individual 
rights.” The problem is the relatively new proliferation of constitutionally 
grounded exit rights. Obviously, though, not all rights are “rights to exit,” or 
even trend that way. One type of right, furthermore, is the diametrical opposite. 
Civil rights, virtually by definition, are not exit rights. At their core, and for 
good reason, civil rights have been called rights of participation, rights of 
inclusion, rights of membership, or most tellingly, rights of belonging. For my 
purposes, civil rights are rights to enter civil society – the same civil society 
from which all of our newfound Constitutional rights guarantee exit. 
According to Tom Paine’s iconic essay, Rights of Man, civil rights are those 
natural rights we enjoy by virtue not only of our humanity – this is true of all 
natural rights – but by virtue of our membership in society.51 Moreover, unlike 
some of our more familiar natural rights, such as rights to the mind, to 
conscience, or to freedom of action, Paine argued that civil rights are those 
rights we cannot enforce without the aid of the law, state, and civil society.52 
 
51 PAINE, supra note 12, at 68. 
52 Id. 
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According to Paine, civil rights have three defining attributes: they are (1) 
natural rights (2) that arise by virtue of one’s membership in society, and (3) 
that cannot be enforced or protected on their own. They are, in modern 
parlance, natural and positive rights of societal membership; they are rights to 
law, rather than rights to be free of law. They are rights to enjoy access to those 
laws and social institutions that facilitate the full enjoyment of a flourishing 
life. Civil rights are, in other words, rights to enter civil society. By virtue of 
our antidiscrimination law, those rights cannot be denied to any person on the 
basis of race, sex, disability and so on. Antidiscrimination law protects our 
equal enjoyment of our civil rights. The civil rights thus protected, however, 
are those rights to enter and then fully participate in civil life. 
And what are they? What are those natural rights we enjoy by virtue of 
membership in society, and which we cannot enforce on our own? Let me first 
answer the question positivistically by briefly listing those positive civil rights 
won over time. To the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, those civil 
rights of protection, which cannot be denied on the basis of prior enslavement, 
included rights to contract, own property, write a will, and sue on account of 
injury.53 The Enforcement Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act) added to that list 
the right to be protected against private violence such as lynchings.54 The 
constitutionally doomed Civil Rights Act of 1875 famously added to the list 
the rights to enjoy public accommodations and transportation.55 According to 
modern historians, in the 1930s and 1940s “civil rights” primarily denoted 
labor rights, including the right to safe and well-compensated labor, and 
eventually, the right to unionize and strike.56 By mid-century, and by virtue of 
 
53 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (“[S]uch citizens, of every race 
and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . . . 
shall have the same right . . . to make and endorse contracts, to sue, be parties, and give 
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and 
to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property . . . .”). 
54 Ku Klux Klan Act of 1878 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012) (providing a cause of 
action against private parties who conspire to “depriv[e], either directly or indirectly, any 
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and 
immunities under the laws”). 
55 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 336, held unconstitutional by The Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (discussing rights to “full and equal enjoyment of the 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land 
or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement”). 
56 William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 59-60 
(1999) (“Workers’ rights to associate, assemble, unionize, and strike constituted First, 
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims repeatedly spurned by the courts that labor 
brought again and again to Congress and state legislatures. . . . Finally, in the ‘30s, Congress 
embraced much of labor’s exiled interpretations of the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments . . . .”); Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of 
Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609, 1669-74 (2001) (discussing the “centrality of labor” to 
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a civil rights movement that eventually led to the enactment of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, our civil rights included rights to nondiscriminatory education57 
and employment opportunities.58 All of these civil rights fit well within Paine’s 
understanding of civil rights. Civil rights to contract, property, and so forth are 
grounded in natural rights, but they are also clearly rights we have by virtue of 
membership in society and which we can enjoy only insofar as the state 
enforces them. And the same is true of rights to employment and educational 
opportunities, public transportation and so on. All of these rights are “rights to 
enter” some aspect of civil society – be it commerce, education, employment, 
or some public space, such as theatres, public transportation, and 
accommodations – and all of them depend on positive law for their full 
perfection. 
The last third of the twentieth century and the first two decades of this one, 
have seen a major expansion of our civil rights to enter. We have extended our 
civil rights to enter to groups heretofore excluded, for example through the 
Age Discrimination and Americans with Disabilities Acts,59 and possibly the 
Equal Employment Act as well. And, at the same time, we have expanded our 
conception of the civil society to which civil rights protect entrance. 
Consequently, today our civil rights include a host of familial rights, such as 
the right to be protected against domestic violence60 and the right to not be 
deprived of a job by virtue of our caregiving responsibilities.61 They also 
include the right to a quality education regardless of poverty or disability.62 
Most recently, our civil rights have come to include, at least arguably, rights to 
health insurance and to the health care that such insurance facilitates, rights to 
marry whomever we love, regardless of gender or sexual orientation, and rights 
to immigrate on fair and humane conditions.63 
 
Department of Justice’s definition of civil rights in the late 1930s and 1940s, id. at 1669). 
57 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
58 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012). 
59 Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6106, 6106a, 6107 (2012); 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
60 Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
61 Family Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 and 29 U.S.C.). 
62 See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 
14005-14006, 123 Stat. 115, 282; No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 
115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2012)). 
63 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 46b-20a (West Supp. 2013) (codifying the right to marriage for opposite- and 
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All of these contemporary civil rights fit Paine’s definition: they are all 
natural rights grounded in our nature, but which we are owed by virtue of our 
membership in society. And we cannot enforce them on our own without the 
aid of the state, a considerable body of enabling law, civil society, and civil 
society’s institutions. We enjoy the fruits of our contracts because of the law 
that enables us to contract at all, not because of a natural instinct to bargain. 
We cannot contract, own property, or write a will without contract law, 
property law, and estate law. We cannot acquire a quality education without a 
healthy dollop of law, pedagogy, administration and regulation; without law 
and educational institutions only a very few of us would discern those lovely 
Pythagorean theorems all on our own. We cannot labor fairly and freely 
without the wind of employment law and its enabling institutions at our back; 
our labor otherwise would be soul numbing and exploitative. We cannot enjoy 
a long and healthy life without the protections accorded by law and medicine, 
without them, our lives would be nasty and short, if not brutal. And we cannot 
enjoy a safe life – that is, physical security – either in our communities or in 
our homes, without the protection of the state against the private violence that 
disables it. These civil rights provide access to civil society, which we could 
not possibly enjoy without law: they are the rights to the law, legal institutions, 
and social structures that define the spheres of civil life. 
Paine added one final definitional claim, in his brief but fecund discussion 
of the various differences between natural and civil rights. The right to 
protection by the state against private violence – the civil right to physical 
security – he argued, is the quintessential civil right.64 It is owed to us by virtue 
of our membership in society, and it is not susceptible to enforcement by 
anyone on his own. To take those in order: A safe and long life is, in Sen and 
Nussbaum’s compelling language, a natural “capability,” the enjoyment of 
which is central to “human flourishing.”65 But the right we have to the 
protection of our security so that we can enjoy that natural capability, is held 
not by virtue of our humanity, but by virtue of our membership in society. It is 
a right that any liberal state must protect, in Sen and Nussbaum’s modern 
formulation of exactly the same idea. Moreover, it is one that we clearly cannot 
enforce on our own: self-help alone will not keep any of us safe, as Hobbes 
understood all too well. We need the state. We need the positive protection of 
the law. With that protection, we can expect a safe life of ordinary duration, 
uninterrupted by private violence. We have, then, a civil right to the state’s 
protection against civil violence. With it, we enter civil society and as an equal. 
 
same-sex couples); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2013) 
(same); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (2012 & Supp. 2013) (same). 
64 PAINE, supra note 12, at 68. 
65 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH 148 (2001); Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 
30, 31 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). 
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Without it, either we are slaves to whomever has legal violent power over us or 
we are out in the cold. 
The centrality of the civil right to the state’s protection against private 
violence is a constant thread in our various civil rights laws and traditions, 
spanning two centuries. It finds poignant but emphatic expression in the Ku 
Klux Klan Enforcement Act of 1871: freed slaves must have a right to the 
state’s protection against lynchings and other conspiracies of violence in order 
to fully and equally participate in, or enter, civil society.66 If the state militia 
will not provide it, then the national government must. To be subject to private 
violence that is unchecked by the state is to be subject to another master and 
hence denied equal membership; it is to be thrust back into a state of effective 
slavery. The same insight is echoed a century later in the Violence Against 
Women Act. Victims of domestic abuse must be protected against intimate 
violence, if they are to enjoy equal and full citizenship.67 State protection 
against civil violence – recognized by the drafters of both acts over a hundred 
years apart – is a if not the fundamental civil right; it is the right on which 
participation in civil society is fundamentally dependent. Anyone deprived of 
that right is denied entrance. Anyone subject to unchecked private violence is 
outside the sphere of the law’s protection. 
We have a civil right to protection by the state against private violence. In 
exchange, we relinquish our natural right to self-help. We have a constitutional 
right, though, to exit just that contract, and take up our own arms toward the 
same end. The exit right threatens the civil right. The same is true of civil 
society writ large: we have civil rights to enter civil society and we have 
constitutional rights to exit it. Again the latter threaten the former. The threat, 
however, while serious, clearly does not stem from the very idea of rights, or 
even individual rights. The threat to both civil society and the civil rights that 
protect our rights to enter it comes from our recently constitutionalized rights 
to exit. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me sum up and then draw one moral. During roughly the same period 
that our Courts have constructed various constitutional rights to exit the 
obligations, burdens, and even the benefits of civil society, Congress, and to a 
lesser but still meaningful extent, state legislatures, have created a variety of 
civil rights to enter it. These rights are in considerable tension. We have no 
constitutional right to a police force, courtesy of DeShaney,68 but we do have a 
civil right, emanating from a social compact and recognized in a host of civil 
rights laws over two centuries, to the state’s protection against violence, in 
exchange for our forbearance of self-help. Perhaps they would be in equipoise, 
 
66 Ku Klux Klan Act of 1878 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012). 
67 Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
68 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
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but for this: we also have had now for over a decade a constitutional right to 
own and use a gun – including in lethal acts of self-defense. So, we now have a 
constitutional right to exit the social compact from which the civil right to 
protection by the state against private violence is derived. Similarly, we do not 
have a constitutional right to a high quality public education, at least none that 
the Courts, rather than commentators, have seen fit to articulate. But we do 
have a civil right to one, again emanating from an inter-generational social 
compact. And, the state clearly has an obligation to provide it, in exchange for 
our duty to support and participate in it, as recognized in most state 
constitutions, in a host of federal laws from NCLB to IDEA to RTTT, and by 
the Supreme Court itself in Brown v Board of Education. Again, perhaps these 
would be in equipoise, but for this: We also have, according to some dicta in 
court opinions and highly impactful public advocacy, a constitutional exit right 
to quit the social compact that gives rise to the civil right. We may have a 
right, that is, to take our kids out of public schools and homeschool them. We 
do not have a constitutional right to nondiscrimination in the private sphere, 
although we obviously have civil rights to nondiscrimination in the private 
sphere, as codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Yet here as elsewhere over 
the last few years, the courts have drawn ever broadening constitutional exit 
rights, by which some employers can avoid the burdens of nondiscrimination 
law, if the employer’s corporate conscience is at odds with policy that emerges 
from the democratic process that is part and parcel with the social compact. 
We have no constitutional right to health or to health care, although we do 
have a very precarious civil right to one, regardless of our ability to pay. That 
civil right is the product of as clear a social compact as one can imagine: a 
contract by which healthy and sick, young and old, jointly undertake a public 
health project by pooling and spreading risks of disease, accident, and 
advanced age. As the young will one day be old and the healthy will one day 
be sick, all are burdened, but all are benefited. But the healthy individual might 
have a constitutional exit right to refuse to buy the health insurance that would 
facilitate that care, and states quite clearly have a constitutional right to refuse 
to extend the health care to its poorer citizens that stems most directly from the 
social compact – Medicaid. We have no constitutional right to a job, much less 
one that pays well and can be performed in safe conditions, although perhaps 
we should have a civil right to just that. But we apparently have a 
constitutional right to refuse to support with dues a union that represents us in 
attempts to secure one. And so forth. Our civil rights are more often than not to 
benefits derived from civil society and from the social compact that is at its 
heart – benefits, however, that are not protected by constitutional rights. Our 
newest generation of constitutional rights – exit rights – give individuals and 
corporations rights to exit the obligations and forego the rights derived from 
that compact and the civil society arises from that compact. 
What to do, if we care about these rights, and the civil society they 
structure? The lack of constitutional rights to health, to safety, to education, to 
fair labor, to nondiscrimination and so forth is obviously detrimental to civil 
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society, but it is also obviously not fatal. And the Constitution, while it does 
not grant these positive rights, clearly does not forbid Congress from granting 
them. The new generation of exit rights the courts have fashioned, however, do 
have the potential to unravel civil society, depending on the extent to which 
they are embraced. Obviously, if enough healthy individuals exercise their 
constitutional right to not buy health insurance, the ACA is threatened. If 
enough homeowners and individuals arm themselves, and exercise their 
constitutional rights to lethal self-defense, the safety we garner by virtue of our 
publicly funded police force is badly compromised. If too many parents pull 
their children from the public schools and school them at home, the fiscal 
solvency of public schools and the citizen-focused norms of liberalism and 
tolerance integral to the public curriculum are undermined. More generally, 
and more rhetorically, if we accept the understanding of American identity, of 
constitutionalism, and of individualism at the heart of these rights of exit, their 
potency is magnified. If we accept an understanding of ourselves as 
fundamentally entitled, by virtue of the Constitution we have all sworn to 
uphold and all citizens are taught to revere, to exit from fundamental social 
projects, then not only those projects, but the idea of civil society itself, is 
seriously eroded. 
The constitutional rights tradition, however, is not the only “rights tradition” 
game in town. It is not the only understanding of rights available to us. Civil 
rights are also a part of our history. They differ in some obvious and 
compelling ways. They have a dramatically different pedigree: civil rights, 
unlike constitutional rights, are (mostly, not entirely) a product of democracy 
rather than a constraint on it. They respect community, not just individuality, 
and they rest on a cooperative rather than competitive understanding of our 
contractual and quasi-contractual relations with our co-citizens. Most crucially, 
though, civil rights have a fundamentally different point: civil rights, unlike 
constitutional rights, invite participation in our civil society rather than threaten 
its demise. They have from the beginning been motivated by both norms of 
humanity and social inclusion. They protect and respect community rather than 
a relentless and often damaging individualism, and they structure and animate 
our civil society rather than target it. 
My prescriptive suggestion is that if we value American civil society we 
should take a break from our constitutional rights tradition and renew our 
commitment to civil rights. Civil rights define a set of traditions and an ethical 
way of thinking and being that is worth understanding, deepening, and 
extending. If we could attend to our civil rights with the same meticulous 
scholarly, political, and ethical care we have devoted lately to constitutional 
rights and constitutionalism, we would likely find the beginnings of a path out 
of our currently dysfunctional morass. We could start, for example, by 
insisting that the quest for sensible gun legislation is a defining civil rights 
issue of our time, and not just a matter of good policy. We could articulate the 
content and boundaries of our civil rights to a high quality public education, 
decent jobs, and health care. Were we to do this, we would to some extent at 
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least even the playing field: the rights to homeschool, to “at will employment,” 
to not buy insurance, to opt out of union dues and nondiscrimination 
obligations, and to own and fire a gun would all have counters in rights, rather 
than only in the always somewhat ominous sounding “police powers” of the 
state. Rights to health, education, labor, safety and so on do, of course, 
emanate from the state’s police powers, and of course the state should employ 
that power toward good policy objectives. But they also emanate from our 
humanity and our membership in civil society, and they are rights we simply 
cannot enforce on our own. As such, they reflect, originate in, and ground civil 
society and the compacts at its core. When we neglect them, we neglect their 
fruit – the seeds of democracy. 
This is, of course, only a partial answer to the problem of a dysfunctional 
Congress. It addresses the civil society part of the “perfect storm” that besets 
our government and that Yasmin Dawood describes so well.69 But it is, I 
believe, a part of the answer. If we are going to redress the civil society deficit, 
one way to do it is through a reinvigorated commitment to our civil rights 
traditions. We should not hesitate to do so because we have over-read the 
import of the rights critiques of the last thirty years. Rights themselves are not 
the problem. Rights that target civil society and the social compact – and do so 
in the name of the Constitution – are. 
 
 
69 Yasmin Dawood, Democratic Dysfunction and Constitutional Design, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
913 (2014). 
